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Despite the prevalent and natural use of metaphor in everyday language, the neural
basis of this powerful communication device remains poorly understood. Early studies
of brain-injured patients suggested the right hemisphere plays a critical role in metaphor
comprehension, but more recent patient and neuroimaging studies do not consistently
support this hypothesis. One explanation for this discrepancy is the challenge in designing
optimal tasks for brain-injured populations. As traditional aphasia assessments do not
assess ﬁgurative language comprehension, we designed a new metaphor comprehension
task to consider whether impaired metaphor processing is missed by standard clinical
assessments. Stimuli consisted of 60 pairs of moderately familiar metaphors and closely
matched literal sentences. Sentences were presented visually in a randomized order,
followed by four adjective-noun answer choices (target + three foil types). Participants
were instructed to select the phrase that best matched the meaning of the sentence.
We report the performance of three focal lesion patients and a group of 12 healthy,
older controls. Controls performed near ceiling in both conditions, with slightly more
accurate performance on literal than metaphoric sentences. While the Western Aphasia
Battery (Kertesz, 1982) and the objects and actions naming battery (Druks and Masterson,
2000) indicated minimal to no language difﬁculty, our metaphor comprehension task
indicated three different proﬁles of metaphor comprehension impairment in the patients’
performance. Single case statistics revealed comparable impairment on metaphoric
and literal sentences, disproportionately greater impairment on metaphors than literal
sentences, and selective impairment on metaphors. We conclude our task reveals that
patients can have selective metaphor comprehension deﬁcits. These deﬁcits are not
captured by traditional neuropsychological language assessments, suggesting overlooked
communication difﬁculties.
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INTRODUCTION
Metaphor is pervasive in everyday language, and often used to
communicate complex, abstract, or unfamiliar concepts. Individ-
uals encounter metaphors on a daily basis in the classroom (The
Bohr model atom is a tiny solar system), in their social lives (Our ﬁrst
date was a train wreck), and in the media (Congress froze the bud-
get). As a communication device, metaphor is practical, allowing
familiar information to sculpt and inform new concepts. Concep-
tualized this way, metaphor is fundamental to the ﬂexibility of
human thought, revealing novel commonalities, facilitating learn-
ing, and enabling abstraction (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gentner,
1983).
Despite the ubiquity of metaphor in thought and lan-
guage, its neural instantiation remains uncertain. In an early
formal demonstration of metaphor deﬁcits following brain
injury, Winner and Gardner (1977) found that right-hemisphere
damaged (RHD) patients, but not left-hemisphere damaged
(LHD) patients or healthy controls, had difﬁculty match-
ing metaphoric sentences to pictures, suggesting the right
hemisphere was uniquely tuned for metaphor comprehension.
Several subsequent patient studies supported this claim (Brownell
et al., 1984, 1990; Van Lancker and Kempler, 1987; Mackenzie
et al., 1999; Champagne et al., 2004; Klepousniotou and Baum,
2005a,b). However, in some of these cases only RHD patients
and controls were tested, providing no means of comparison
between the hemispheres (Mackenzie et al., 1999; Champagne
et al., 2004, 2007; Rinaldi et al., 2004) or RHD patients who
performed at ceiling were excluded from analyses (Brownell
et al., 1990). These studies sometimes also contained few items
(e.g., as few as three or four in Brownell et al., 1990; Tomp-
kins, 1990; Giora et al., 2000; Zaidel et al., 2002), showed that
impairment depended on task (Winner and Gardner, 1977), or
failed to show any hemispheric differences when task demands
were accounted for statistically (Zaidel et al., 2002). Nonethe-
less, the ﬁrst neuroimaging study of metaphor comprehension
supported the right-hemisphere hypothesis (Bottini et al., 1994),
bolstering the tentative claims made by the patient stud-
ies. Thus, the prevailing view became that metaphor com-
prehension was a lateralized, right hemisphere dominant
process.
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Many subsequent neuroimaging studies of metaphor com-
prehension, however, have failed to ﬁnd the right-lateralized
activations predicted by the right-hemisphere hypothesis of
metaphor comprehension. Most studies report activation in both
hemispheres (Eviatar and Just, 2006; Stringaris et al., 2006, 2007;
Ahrens et al., 2007; Mashal et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Bambini
et al., 2011; Desai et al., 2011; Diaz et al., 2011; Cardillo et al., 2012;
Lacey et al., 2012; Shibata et al., 2012; Uchiyama et al., 2012) and
some only left-lateralized activations (Rapp et al., 2004, 2007; Lee
andDapretto,2006; Kircher et al., 2007; Shibata et al., 2007;Mashal
et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2009; Diaz and Hogstrom, 2011; Forgács
et al., 2012). Recent meta-analyses conﬁrm left-hemisphere dom-
inance for ﬁgurative language, including metaphor. Although the
right hemisphere is indeed often responsive to metaphoric stim-
uli, its contribution is neither equivalent to nor stronger than
that of the left hemisphere; it is weaker (Rapp et al., 2012) or
absent (Bohrn et al., 2012). Consistent with this conclusion, some
patient studies found metaphor comprehension to be compara-
bly impaired following left or right hemisphere injury (Tompkins,
1990; Gagnon et al., 2003), or more impaired following left than
right injury (Giora et al., 2000).
Unsurprisingly, divergent lesion and neuroimaging data have
not led to consensus regarding the laterality of metaphor com-
prehension (Schmidt et al., 2010). One explanation for these
discrepancies is heterogeneity of stimuli and/or task demands.
We have addressed stimulus design extensively elsewhere (Cardillo
et al., 2010) and will address choice of task here. Tasks common in
neuroimaging studieswithhealthy adults donot always extendwell
to patient populations. On the one hand, passive tasks like silent
reading or periodic comprehension probes provide insufﬁcient
behavioral correlates for measurement. On the other hand, more
demanding, semantic tasks like valence or plausibility judgment
may elicit poor performance because of difﬁcultywith the decision
aspect of the task or a response-bias, not because of a comprehen-
sion problem, per se. These tasks also cannot tell us anything about
what a person understood the sentence to mean. Comprehension
of metaphoric sentences could be assessed with yes/no questions
(Gagnon et al., 2003; Eviatar and Just, 2006; Prat et al., 2012), how-
ever, this task produces a relatively insensitive measure. Random
guessing alonewould produce 50%accuracy. Further, poor perfor-
mance can only indicate a patient has metaphor comprehension
difﬁculty, but provides no insight into the many possible reasons
for a comprehension failure.
Experimental tasks commonly used with patients also present
interpretive challenges. Evaluating metaphor comprehension with
picture-matching may introduce visuospatial confounds in RHD
patients, who perform better than LHD patients when asked
to provide oral explanations of the same metaphors (Winner
and Gardner, 1977; Mackenzie et al., 1999; Giora et al., 2000;
Zaidel et al., 2002; Rinaldi et al., 2004). Oral explanations pro-
vide rich information but are difﬁcult to quantify and neces-
sitate fewer items than forced choice tasks (Giora et al., 2000;
Zaidel et al., 2002; Champagne et al., 2004). In addition, some
LHD aphasics may have difﬁculty conveying full comprehen-
sion in this format because of language production problems
(Winner and Gardner, 1977). Semantic similarity judgments – in
which a patient matches a metaphoric expression (e.g., bright) to
its ﬁgurative sense (e.g., clever) – avoid many of the previously
mentioned confounds. However, stimuli used in such tasks have
been highly heterogeneous. Single words, dyads, and triads have
all been used and studies have varied in how thoroughly or compa-
rably they have matched answer choices and conditions on lexical
confounds that are not of interest (Brownell et al., 1984, 1990;
Gagnon et al., 2003).
Clinical assessments of language function following brain
injury are even less discerning. Neurologists, speech patholo-
gists, and neuropsychologists rely on diagnostic batteries to reveal
compromised language skills, target speech-language rehabilita-
tion approaches, and alert patients and their caregivers to areas
of potential communication difﬁculty. The commonly adminis-
tered Western Aphasia Battery (WAB; Kertesz, 1982), for instance,
assesses spoken and written language production and compre-
hension, classifying patients by aphasia diagnosis and severity of
impairment in different domains.
Although widely used, the WAB exclusively assesses literal lan-
guage skills. Other aphasia assessments are similarly lacking. The
Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination (Goodglass and Kaplan,
1983), the Porch Index of Communicative Ability (Porch, 1971),
Minnesota Test for Differential Diagnosis of Aphasia (Schuell,
1965), and the Aphasia Diagnostic Proﬁles (Helm-Estabrooks,
1992) also do not contain any assessment or mention of metaphor.
This clinical oversight runs contrary to commonexperience. Other
batteries such as the Right Hemisphere Language Battery (Bryan,
1989) and Montreal Evaluation of Communications (Joanette
et al., 2004) do include a ﬁgurative subtest but rely on items
not motivated by current theoretical and methodological con-
siderations relevant to metaphor comprehension (Cardillo et al.,
2010; Schmidt et al., 2010). Furthermore, these batteries are rarely
administered to patients with left hemisphere injury.
Given the limitations of existing metaphor comprehension
tasks, we developed a new sentence-level, multiple-choice match-
ing task to address these methodological challenges. Sentence
stimuli – a staple of neuroimaging studies of metaphor – are
preferable to single words, as they are metaphor’s most commonly
encountered form. Their complexity however, requires careful
balancing between ﬁgurative and literal conditions in terms of dif-
ﬁculty, a level of control that is rarely documented. Despite their
naturalness and the feasibility of generating closely matched stim-
uli (e.g., Cardillo et al., 2010), sentence-level metaphors have not
to our knowledge been usedwith patients. In our task, participants
read a sentence and then chose from an array of four phrases the
one that best matches its meaning (one correct target, three incor-
rect foils). This task has several advantages over other measures:
(1) it avoids the visuospatial confounds of picture-matching, (2)
it avoids the qualitative nature of oral explanations, (3) it avoids
the low sensitivity of yes/no questions, (4) it uses naturalistic
language, and (5) it explicitly acknowledges different metaphor
subtypes. We demonstrate that the metaphor multiple choice task
can be used to reveal unrecognized metaphor deﬁcits in brain-
injured patients by presenting three illustrative cases. We further
demonstrate that this approach can identify metaphor-speciﬁc
deﬁcits, distinct from general comprehension deﬁcits and unrec-
ognized by traditional neuropsychological assessments of lan-
guage. Finally, we show that systematically designed foils provide
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information about the nature of a patient’s comprehension
failure.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Participants were three unilateral focal lesion patients enrolled in
the University of Pennsylvania Focal Lesion Database. Patients
with a history of other neurological disorders, psychiatric dis-
orders, or substance abuse are excluded from the database. The
patients presented here were drawn from an ongoing, large-scale
group study of metaphor comprehension and speciﬁcally selected
based on their observed behavioral patterns on our task. Sample
size was dictated by the number of unique comprehension proﬁles
that, when presented together, illustrate the capability of our task
to detect and distinguish different kinds of metaphor impairment.
Detailed demographic and neuropsychological information about
the patients is provided in Table 1 and an axial view of their injury
location is provided in Figure 1.
Patient 444DX is an 81 year-old retired factory worker who
suffered an ischemic stroke 120 months prior to testing. The
Philadelphia Brief Assessment of Cognition (PBAC), a brief
dementia-screening instrument, was administered to assess func-
tion in ﬁve cognitive domains: working memory/executive con-
trol, lexical retrieval/language, visuospatial/visuoconstructional
operations, verbal/visual episodic memory, and behavior/social
comportment (Libon et al., 2011). Performance indicated com-
promised visuospatial, memory, and executive functions but
normal language and social skills. Object and action nam-
ing battery (OANB) scores conﬁrmed clinically normal lexi-
cal access for common object and action names (Druks and
Masterson, 2000) and administration of the Western Apha-
sia Battery (Kertesz, 1982) likewise indicated clinically normal
language abilities. An MRI scan demonstrated a lesion dam-
aging the posterior temporal and parietal cortex of the right
hemisphere.
Patient 384BX is a 74 year-old, retired butcher who suffered a
hemorrhagic stroke 144 months prior to testing. Performance on
thePBAC indicated compromised visuospatial,memory, and exec-
utive functions but normal language and social skills. Following
injury he reported halting speech and stuttering. Administration
of the WAB revealed some residual difﬁculty with naming and a
diagnosis of mild anomia. OANB scores, however, indicated clin-
ically normal lexical access for common object and action names.
An MRI scan demonstrated a lesion undercutting the superior
frontal gyrus of the left hemisphere.
Patient 642KM is a 78 year-old retired construction man-
ager who suffered an ischemic stroke 130 months prior to
testing. Performance on the PBAC indicated compromised mem-
ory and executive function but normal visuospatial, language,
and social skills. OANB scores indicated clinically normal lexi-
cal access for common object and action names, and the WAB
score indicated clinically normal language abilities. An MRI scan
demonstrated a lesion damaging the parietal cortex of the left
hemisphere.
Twelve neurologically healthy older adults recruited from the
University of Pennsylvania Control Database served as a control
population (Age: 64.3 ± 9.9, Education: 14.4 ± 2.6) and were paid
$15/h for their participation. All participants were native English
speakers, right-handed andgave informedconsent toparticipate in
accordance with the Institutional Review Board of the University
of Pennsylvania.
STIMULI
Sentences
Stimuli consisted of 60 metaphor-literal sentence pairs of three
types. One third of the items were of the nominal-entity form,
one third were of the nominal-event form, and one third were
of predicate form. Nouns referring to concrete entities or objects
(e.g., bullet, cheetah, drum) served as the metaphorical words in
nominal-entity sentences, nominalized verbs in nominal-event
sentences [e.g., (a) dance, (a) limp, (a) fall], and verbs in pred-
icate sentences (e.g., ran, giggled, argued). All nominal-entity
and nominal-event metaphors were of the form “The X was a
Y” where Y was the word being used metaphorically. All pred-
icate metaphors consisted of a noun phrase and an action verb
followed by a prepositional phrase. In these items the verb was
the word used metaphorically. It remains to be seen if different
types of metaphor are also delineated at the cognitive or neural
level (Cardillo et al., 2012). Given that objects and actions, as well
as nouns and verbs, have been shown to differ in their semantic
properties and neural instantiations (Damasio and Tranel, 1993;
Martin et al., 1995; Kable et al., 2002, 2005) it is possible that their
Table 1 | Demographic and neuropsychological profiles of cases.
Patient Sex Age Education
(years)
Lesion
side
Region Lesion
volume1
Type of
stroke
Chronicity
(months)
P-BAC WAB
(AQ)2
OANB
Exec
(26
max)
Mem
(27
max)
VisSp
(18
max)
Lang
(12
max)
Beh
(24
max)
Actions Objects
444DX F 81 12 R PT 15496 Ischemic 120 21.5 15 13 11.5 24 95.5 94.0 93.0
384BX M 74 12 L F 11306 Hemorrhagic 143 19.5 14 13 10 24 91.3 100.0 98.8
642KM M 78 12 L P 7996 Ischemic 130 19 16 18 11 24 96.8 94.0 98.0
T, temporal; P, parietal; F, frontal; Exec, executive function; Mem, Verbal/visual episodic memory; VisSp, visuospatial/visuoconstructional operations; Lang, lexical
retrieval/language; Beh, behavior/social comportment.
1Voxel size = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm; 2Within normal limits cut-off = 93.8.
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FIGURE 1 | Representative view of brain injury location in each
case.
ﬁgurative extensions do as well. Although investigating the role of
syntactic form and semantic properties of source terms was not
the focus of this study, the possibility of encountering category-
speciﬁc deﬁcits dictated that different types of metaphor were
balanced.
Forty nominal-entity, 40 nominal-event, and 40 predicate sen-
tence pairs were selected from a superset of 624 sentence pairs
[80 pairs were taken from Cardillo et al. (2010) and 80 pairs were
drawn from a pool of 312 items designed and normed using iden-
tical methods] using Stochastic Optimization of Stimuli software
(Armstrong et al., 2012). Optimized selection ensured metaphors
and literals were matched in terms of familiarity, length (number
of words, number of content words, number of characters), aver-
age content word frequency, average content word concreteness,
and positive valence ratio (p’s > 0.10). As previously observed
(Cardillo et al., 2010), metaphors were judged to be signiﬁcantly
less imageable (p < 0.005) and natural (p < 0.01) than their lit-
eral counterparts, and signiﬁcantly more ﬁgurative (p < 0.005).
Sentences of different types (nominal-entity, nominal-event, pred-
icate) were further matched on interpretability (metaphors only),
ﬁgurativeness (metaphors only), familiarity, naturalness, image-
ability, length (number of words, number of content words,
number of characters), frequency, concreteness, and positive
valence ratio (p’s > 0.10). Means and standard deviations of
12 collected psycholinguistic variables are summarized below in
Table 2.
Answer choices
Four answer choices were generated to accompany each sentence:
one correct target and three incorrect foils. All answer choices were
composed of an adjective or adverb, followed by a noun. As shown
in Table 3, in the metaphor condition the target was related to the
ﬁgurative meaning of the sentence, Foil 1 was related to the literal
sense of the sentence, Foil 2 was the opposite of the metaphorical
sense of the sentence, and Foil 3 was unrelated. Foils were designed
to be informative of the type of language deﬁcit present. A Foil 1
selection indicates a literal bias in metaphor comprehension. A
Foil 2 selection indicates a semantic integration impairment, as
themetaphorical sense of the sourcewordwasnecessarily activated
but incorrectly interpreted in the context of the sentence. A Foil 3
selection indicates a more general comprehension deﬁcit, as it is
entirely unrelated to the sentence.
In the literal condition, the foils were designed to mirror the
difﬁculty and nature of foil types in the metaphor condition as
closely as possible. The target was related to the literal meaning
Table 2 | Psycholinguistic properties of literal and metaphoric sentences.
Literal Metaphor
Nominal- Nominal- Predicate Nominal- Nominal- Predicate
Entity Event Entity Event
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Base auditory imagery 2.63 (1.2) 2.61 (1.4) 2.07 (1.16) 2.63 (1.2) 2.61 (1.4) 2.07 (1.16)
Base visual imagery 3.66 (1.14) 3.2 (0.59) 3.41 (0.72) 3.66 (1.14) 3.2 (0.59) 3.41 (0.72)
Concreteness 480 (76) 474 (46) 500 (53) 450 (57) 449 (69) 474 (76)
Frequency* 92.9 (159) 89.9 (142.4) 86.7 (85.3) 90.8 (123.7) 91.8 (128) 95.6 (133.7)
No. of characters 33.3 (4.2) 32 (5.1) 33.6 (5.2) 34.3 (4.6) 32.7 (5.2) 34.9 (4)
No. of words 6.1 (0.4) 6.2 (0.4) 6.2 (0.5) 6.1 (0.6) 6.1 (0.5) 6 (0.6)
No. of content words 3.2 (0.5) 3.2 (0.4) 3.3 (0.5) 3.2 (0.5) 3.1 (0.5) 3.3 (0.4)
Interpretability n/a n/a n/a 0.94 (0.08) 0.94 (0.08) 0.96 (0.05)
Familiarity 5.28 (0.73) 5.14 (1.11) 5.26 (1.23) 4.96 (0.76) 4.83 (1.18) 4.86 (1.37)
Naturalness 5.68 (0.73) 5.76 (0.95) 5.48 (1.24) 4.84 (0.82) 5.1 (1.07) 4.8 (1.34)
Imageability 5.55 (0.83) 5.67 (0.97) 5.8 (1.08) 4.17 (0.97) 4.27 (0.78) 3.94 (1.16)
Figurativeness 1.88 (0.73) 2.02 (0.92) 1.78 (0.91) 5.62 (0.56) 5.28 (0.77) 5.25 (1.02)
Valence RT 1279 (213) 1390 (182) 1426 (237) 1351 (131) 1432 (220) 1495 (200)
*SUBTLWF values from Brysbaert and New (2009).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 871 | 4
Ianni et al. Metaphor comprehension after brain injury
Table 3 | Sentence and answer choice examples.
Sentence Syntax Example Target Foil 1 Foil 2 Foil 3
Metaphor Nominal-Entity The coffee was a caffeine bullet. energy jolt military ammunition soothing lullaby funny teacher
Nominal-Event His interest was a mere sniff. weak enthusiasm runny nose delighted fascination rotten fruit
Predicate The debate spun into a brawl. violent incident twirling form peaceful resolution toxic fumes
Literal Nominal-Entity The police evidence was a bullet. lethal weapon conﬁscated goods hospital bandage circus tent
Nominal-Event The rabbit’s twitch was a sniff. nose wiggle epileptic ﬁt completely motionless yoga class
Predicate The top spun into the box. whirling motion glass marble ﬁxed position tiny sailboat
of the sentence, Foil 1 was related to the agent of the sentence by
category membership (but not implied by the sentence), Foil 2
was the opposite of the literal sense of the sentence, and Foil 3 was
unrelated. It was necessarily impossible to make Foil 1 answers
of the same nature as Foil 1 answers in the metaphor condition,
but by presenting a strong lexical associate of one of the con-
tent words, Foil 1 answers were designed to mirror the semantic
selection demands of Foil 1 answers in the metaphor condition
(which presented a meaning strongly associated with the source
term). Given the reversed valence necessarily entailed by the Foil
2 condition (the opposite of the target meaning), an additional
constraint on all answer choices was introduced to avoid valence-
related biases in selection: for both metaphor and literal items,
Target and Foil 2 had opposite valences and Target and Foil 3 had
the same valence.
Finally, frequency values for the answer choices were collected
from SUBTLEXus (Brysbaert and New, 2009). No signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in average frequency were found between literal and
metaphor conditions, between sentence types, or between answer
choices. Concreteness values were also collected from the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) and the University of
South Florida Norms (Nelson et al., 2004). For those words that
did not have published concreteness values, we collected our own
using the procedures of Cardillo et al. (2010). Given the abstract
nature of metaphor, Target and Foil 1 answer choices were signif-
icantly different in terms of average concreteness (p < 0.005). In
order to avoid any concreteness-related bias in selection, an addi-
tional constraint on all answer choices was introduced: Target and
Foil 3 also signiﬁcantly differed in concreteness (p < 0.005) and
the target and Foil 2 did not (p> 0.10). Literal answer choices also
followed this pattern: Target and Foil 1 differed in concreteness
(p < 0.001), as did Target and Foil 3 (p < 0.005), but Target and
Foil 2 did not (p > 0.10). As such, answer choices were matched
on frequency, concreteness and valence so none could aid blind
guessing. Table 3 provides examples of sentence and answer choice
stimuli. Full materials are available upon request.
PROCEDURE
Control procedure
All participants made judgments on all 120 items. Subjects were
told to choose the single answer choice which best matched the
“meaning of the sentence,”and to guess if unsure. The taskwas self-
paced. Participants pushed the space bar once for the sentence to
appear. After reading the sentence for comprehension, participants
pushed the space bar again to view the answer choices. Answer
choices were presented in quadrant format below the sentence,
Participants were instructed to indicate an answer choice using
four keys on the keyboard. Sentences were presented centrally in
black, 18-point font on a white background using E-Prime 1.1
software on a Dell Inspiron laptop. Each participant received a
unique, random order of items. The target and each foil had a 25%
chance of appearing in any single quadrant on the screen in any
given trial. Ten practice trials preceded four blocks of experimental
trials.
Patient procedure
The patients’ task was similar to the controls’ with one mod-
iﬁcation: the trials were advanced by the experimenter. The
experimenter pressed the spacebar for the sentence to appear.
This was followed by a 3 s delay, and then the answer choices
were presented beneath the sentence. To avoid motor response
and memory difﬁculties, patients indicated an answer by pointing
to or saying the answer aloud and the experimenter recorded this
answer using the keyboard.
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
An item analysis of healthy controls’ scores revealed three items
whose comprehension fell 3 SD below the average; these items
were eliminated from further analysis. A subject analysis of accu-
racy scores revealed a single individual whose comprehension fell
3 SD below average on any given sentence-type; this individual
was replaced. For controls, accuracy for literal and metaphor con-
ditions was averaged across all participants. For patients, accuracy
in the literal and metaphor conditions was calculated separately
for each individual. Foil proﬁles were generated for each patient
by dividing the number of each type of error (Foil 1, Foil 2, Foil 3)
by the total number of errors in literal and metaphor conditions.
We tested for a comprehension deﬁcit in the metaphor condi-
tion at the level of the individual patient using “Bayesian analysis
for a simple difference,” developed by Crawford et al. (2010). The
analysis was done on standardized scores and repeated for the lit-
eral condition. This test uses Bayesian Monte Carlo methods to
determine if a patient’s score is sufﬁciently below the scores of
controls such that the null hypothesis, that the patient’s score is
an observation from the control population, can be rejected. In
this case, patients with a simple metaphor or literal deﬁcit exhibit
signiﬁcantly reduced comprehension in that condition, relative to
controls.
We also tested for a differential deﬁcit in metaphor comprehen-
sion at the level of the individual patient using “Bayesian analysis
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for a differential difference,” developed by Crawford et al. (2010).
The Bayesian test for a simple difference can only indicate whether
a patient is impaired in the metaphor, literal, or both condi-
tions. It does not distinguish between reduced accuracy due to
difﬁculty with metaphor speciﬁcally and reduced accuracy due to
a general impairment affecting literal and metaphoric language
alike. The Bayesian test for a differential difference however, can
make this distinction by also taking into account the differen-
tial accuracy score and correlation between the two conditions,
as established by the control group. Patients with a differential
metaphor deﬁcit exhibit proportionally greater difﬁculty with
metaphoric than literal sentences than is observed in the control
population.
RESULTS
Overall, the control group performed near ceiling. Literal accuracy
(M = 96.8, SD = 1.98) was signiﬁcantly higher than metaphor
accuracy (M = 93.5, SD = 4.65); t(11) = 2.744; p = 0.019). The
correlation between literal and metaphor accuracy was R = 0.516
(p = 0.044). In the metaphor condition, Foil 1 (the literal sense
of the sentence), was the most common error (66.7%), followed
by Foil 2 (24.4%) and Foil 3 (8.9%). In the literal condition, Foil
1 (related to the agent of the sentence by category membership,
but not implied by the sentence), was the most common error
(78.3%), followed by Foil 2 (17.4%) and Foil 3 (4.3%).
GENERAL SENTENCE COMPREHENSION IMPAIRMENT (444DX)
Application of the Bayesian test for a simple deﬁcit revealed a sim-
ple metaphor comprehension deﬁcit [t(11) = −3.653; p < 0.01]
and a simple literal comprehension deﬁcit [t(11) = −5.004;
p < 0.001], in 444DX. Application of the Bayesian test for a dif-
ferential deﬁcit revealed a non-signiﬁcant difference in metaphor
and literal comprehension scores, indicating a general sentence
comprehension impairment. 444DX made predominantly Foil 1
and Foil 2 errors in both the metaphor and literal conditions. See
Table 4 for detailed reporting of single case statistics.
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPAIRMENT IN METAPHOR COMPREHENSION
(384BX)
Application of the Bayesian test for a simple deﬁcit revealed a sim-
ple metaphor comprehension deﬁcit [t(11) = −8.640; p< 0.005]
and a simple literal comprehension deﬁcit [t(11) = −4.182;
p< 0.001] in 384BX.Application of theBayesian test for a differen-
tial deﬁcit revealed a differential metaphor deﬁcit [t(11) = 4.656;
p < 0.02]. In the metaphor condition, 384BX’s errors were over-
whelmingly Foil 1, while Foil 2 accounted for themajority of errors
in the literal condition. See Table 5 for detailed reporting of single
case statistics.
SELECTIVE IMPAIRMENT IN METAPHOR COMPREHENSION (642KM)
Application of the Bayesian test for a simple deﬁcit revealed
a simple metaphor comprehension deﬁcit [t(11) = −5.790;
p < 0.0001] in 642KM. Literal comprehension was not signiﬁ-
cantly different than that of controls. Application of the Bayesian
test for a differential deﬁcit revealed a differential metaphor deﬁcit
[t(11) = 5.129; p < 0.001]. Like 444DX, 642KM made pre-
dominantly Foil 1 and Foil 2 errors in both the metaphor and
literal conditions. See Table 6 for detailed reporting of single case
statistics.
To summarize, the three patients exhibited three distinct deﬁcit
patterns. 444DX demonstrated general sentence level impairment;
she was impaired on both metaphor and literal comprehension,
but not signiﬁcantly more so on either condition. 384BX demon-
strated a disproportionate metaphor deﬁcit; he was impaired on
both metaphor and literal comprehension, but signiﬁcantly more
so for metaphors. 642KM demonstrated a selective metaphor
deﬁcit; he was impaired on metaphors but displayed normal literal
comprehension.
DISCUSSION
Metaphors are powerful and pervasive communication devices in
everyday language, yet conspicuously absent fromstandard clinical
assessments of language. The purpose of this study was to demon-
strate that a metaphor multiple-choice task can reveal proﬁles
of impaired metaphor comprehension in brain-injured patients
that go undetected by traditional aphasia assessments. Three
unilateral focal lesion patients made judgments on 60 matched
literal-metaphor sentence pairs by choosing the phrase that best
matched the meaning of a given sentence from an array of four
possible answers. Compared to a group of healthy, older adults,
single-case statistics revealed three unique patterns of impaired
metaphor comprehension in the three patients (444DX, 384BX,
642KM). None of these patterns were predicted by their perfor-
mance on standard clinical measures of receptive and expressive
language.
Although the WAB is widely used to diagnose and classify
aphasia following brain injury, it is agnostic with respect to ﬁgu-
rative language, including metaphor. Our data indicate profound,
unrecognized deﬁcits in this domain, impairments that can per-
sist post-injury despite normal literal language comprehension,
and may signiﬁcantly impact daily communication and thinking.
All three cases in our series were impaired in their comprehension
of metaphoric sentences, but the speciﬁc pattern of performance
suggests these deﬁcits were of three different natures.
444DXwas impaired in both literal andmetaphoric conditions.
The absence of a differential deﬁcit suggests that her difﬁculty with
metaphor reﬂects a general sentence comprehension impairment.
444DX’s low performance is surprising considering her near per-
fect accuracy on the WAB, OANB, the language subsection of the
PBAC, and casual conversation. One possibility is that her behav-
ior reﬂects, at least in part, difﬁculty with the semantic executive
demands of the task. A multiple choice problem requires the sys-
tematic consideration and rejection of competingmeanings before
selecting the correct one. 444DX’s performance on the PBAC indi-
cated impaired memory and executive function, domain general
deﬁcits would reasonably impact strategic processing in the lin-
guistic domain as well. Consistent with a difﬁculty in resolving
semantic competition, 444DX remarked, “Some of them were
tricky. A lot of times, I thought there were two correct answers. I
doubted myself several times.”
384BX was also signiﬁcantly impaired in both his literal and
metaphoric comprehension, responding correctly to only 88% of
the literal sentences, and only 52% of the metaphoric sentences.
Unlike 444DX, however, the difference between his metaphoric
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and literal comprehension was greater than would be expected
in healthy adults, indicating a disproportionate difﬁculty with
metaphor. This pattern suggests that a milder, lexical-semantic
comprehension impairment is present in addition to a metaphor-
speciﬁc deﬁcit. The severity of 384BX’s diagnosed anomia, how-
ever, ismild and not suggestive of the severemetaphor impairment
observed. Furthermore, anomia is classiﬁed as an expressive apha-
sia, in which language production is affectedwhile comprehension
is relatively preserved. Therefore 384BX’s poor metaphor compre-
hension cannot be anticipated by the anomia diagnosis. Nor is he
aware of his difﬁculty. In debrieﬁng he remarked, “I started stut-
tering after the stroke,” but “I can still read and remember,” and “I
did not feel like my reading was affected (by the injury).”
Most dramatic was the disproportionate metaphor deﬁcit
demonstrated by 642KM. Consistent with his high scores on
the neuropsychological tests and conversational ease, his perfor-
mance in the literal condition was near ceiling – yet he responded
correctly to only 66% of metaphoric sentences. This pattern
indicates his comprehension failure is speciﬁc to metaphor and
cannot be explained by general language comprehension prob-
lems. Like 384BX, 642KM remained unaware of his impairment
even after testing, remarking, “it was easy,” and “I understood
ninety percent of what I was reading.” As these comments sug-
gest, this comprehension problem is not only unrecognized by
traditional aphasia assessments, but is also opaque to the patient
himself.
As the three cases illustrate, not all metaphor deﬁcits are alike.
Some deﬁcits are “pure,” selective for metaphor while leaving
literal language intact (642KM). In other patients this metaphor-
speciﬁc deﬁcit is accompanied by a milder comprehension deﬁcit
affecting literal language as well (384BX). Still other metaphor-
deﬁcits are reﬂective of a general deﬁcit, impacting metaphoric
and literal language comprehension similarly (444DX). The close
matching of metaphoric and literal conditions on psycholinguistic
variables enables conﬁdent direct comparison of metaphor and
literal comprehension. By contrast, many previous studies have
tested patients on only metaphoric items (Winner and Gardner,
1977; Mackenzie et al., 1999; Giora et al., 2000; Zaidel et al., 2002;
Champagne et al., 2004; Rinaldi et al., 2004), designs that cannot
preclude the possibility of a general comprehension deﬁcit, rather
than a metaphor-speciﬁc one.
The unique foil proﬁles of each patient further illustrate the
diversity of metaphor deﬁcits. 384BX’s errors in the metaphor
condition were overwhelmingly Foil 1 (literal interpretation).
This pattern indicates his metaphor comprehension fails in a
speciﬁc way, resulting in a systematic, highly implausible mis-
interpretation. Literal biases have been reported previously in
brain-damaged patients by Brownell et al. (1984) and Rinaldi
et al. (2004), using picture-matching and a single-word seman-
tic similarity judgment task, respectively. The present study is
the ﬁrst demonstration of literal bias for metaphor comprehen-
sion in which metaphor and literal items were closely matched
on average and in pairwise fashion. Thus, we may conﬁdently
attribute comprehension deﬁcits to difﬁculty with metaphors,
rather than potentially confounding sentence properties (e.g.,
familiarity, length, frequency, concreteness, etc.). In contrast to
384BX, 642KM, and 444DX showed more mixed foil proﬁles,
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with Foil 2 errors in addition to Foil 1 errors. Foil 2 errors indi-
cate the metaphorical meaning was at least partially accessed, but
incorrectly interpreted. This error pattern suggests that the ori-
gin of comprehension failure in cases like 444DX and 642KM is
more complex than for patients presenting only a systematic literal
bias. Understanding the different ways metaphor comprehension
breaks down in the injured brain may enable more appropriate
and targeted rehabilitation strategies.
Metaphor deﬁcits are of clinical interest to patients and their
caregivers for many of the same reasons as general language
impairments, but their effects on communication may be more
insidious. For example, metaphor is an attractive option for
discussing internal emotional states (I exploded at the rude cus-
tomer), abstract concepts (The right thing to do is a gray area) or
explaining new, complex ideas (The brain is a computer). In these
cases, a literal bias would make comprehending the metaphoric
statements as they were intended impossible. Yet, as the normal
neuropsychological proﬁles and the patients’own reﬂectionsmake
plain, metaphor interpretation failures do not announce them-
selves immediately the way literal comprehension deﬁcits do. The
abstract nature of the concepts typically expressed by metaphor
may contribute to their poor detection in casual conversation.
More simply, we are imperfect listeners; if we expect successful
comprehension, we are more likely to project it.
Finally, it is worth noting that both patients demonstrating a
disproportionate metaphor deﬁcit had unilateral left-hemisphere
lesions (384BX, 642KM). Without overstating the importance of
lesion location in such a small sample, this observation is incon-
sistent with the right-hemisphere hypothesis of metaphor, which
predicts metaphor impairments in right- not left-hemisphere
patients. In accordance with the accumulating evidence from
neuroimaging, our data indicate metaphor comprehension is a
not solely a right-hemisphere dependent process. Left-hemisphere
brain-damaged patients may be in as much need for ﬁgurative lan-
guage rehabilitation as right hemisphere injured patients. Research
on the efﬁcacy of therapies targeting metaphor comprehension is
not only scarce, but also customarily only targets right-hemisphere
patients because of their presumed susceptibility to these kinds of
deﬁcits (Lundgren et al., 2006, 2011).
In sum, our results from three illustrative patient cases estab-
lish the utility of a carefully designed multiple choice task as a new
tool in the investigation of the neural basis of metaphor compre-
hension. Focal lesion patients were the focus of this investigation,
but the approach is equally suitable for investigating questions
of metaphor comprehension in other clinical populations or in
neuroimaging studies with healthy adults. The metaphor multiple
choice task uniquely avoids the methodological and interpreta-
tive pitfalls of tasks previously used with patients, while adding
increased sensitivity for capturing different types of comprehen-
sion deﬁcits. Further, although not the aim of the current study,
the inclusion of metaphors of different types enables investigat-
ing current, outstanding theoretical questions about the cognitive
and neural mechanisms supporting metaphor comprehension.
Most importantly, we wish to highlight the clinical utility of
our approach. Our task revealed that patients can have ﬁgurative
language deﬁcits neither evaluated nor predicted by traditional
aphasia assessments. This observation raises the possibility that
many patients that might beneﬁt from targeted therapies are cur-
rently overlooked. We can not see what our tools are not designed
to detect.
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